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A General Interpretation of Transition in the Czech Republic 
(1989-1993) 
 
JIŘÍ KABELE* 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 
Abstract: General interpretations of societal transition provide overall pictures of 
fundamental changes, their basic trends, their time scales, and the clashes between 
the main players. These interpretations allow both participants and analysts to focus 
on the important historical facts and the key social processes. The fundamental 
changes in the Czech Republic since November 1989 are shown here as a transition 
brought about by the interplay of the drama of the erosion of the old regime with 
that of the birth of a new order. The old order was partly dismantled and society 
found itself in transitional anomie, which made it possible to gradually build a new 
one. This transitological view sees a transition as a provisional state of affairs con-
structed by many different persons (individuals, groups, communities and organisa-
tions). This provisional situation is characterised by a rich dynamic of social 
problems, together with an unbalanced and changing distribution of gains and 
losses. The resulting conflicts become – in successful cases – part of the universe of 
myth. In this universe of myth these conflicts are seen as a series of crises/tests 
which push the society indirectly from the old order to the new. The originally open 
transition comes to a close when the participants cease to see the current events as 
provisional. The main task then becomes the normalisation of the new order, the en-
forcement of its regime and coping with the formerly provisional arrangements 
which were in many ways ‘justified’ by the apparent anomie. 
Czech Sociological Review, 1999, Vol. 7 (No. 1: 3-21) 
1. Introduction 
1.1 How can fundamental changes in society be viewed? 
There are two lights in which basic change in a society can be viewed. The first is as a 
transition, that is, as a series of lasting inter-connected and acted events/turning points 
unfolding unevenly on all the macro-, mezo- and micro-levels of society [the transitologi-
cal approach, see, for example, Linz 1974; Dvořáková, Kunc 1994; Kabele 1998b]. The 
second is as a transformation, that is, as a series of linked changes or processes (upwards 
or downwards) which are parallel and basically homogeneous in time and space [e.g. 
Stark 1992]. They can mostly be conceptualised through a combination of strategically 
significant variables. 
The modernisation theory of transformation that is dominant today sees the funda-
mental change in Eastern European societies as based in the introduction of modern insti-
tutions allowing increasing political pluralisation and the introduction of market economy 
systems in society [e.g. Zapf 1991, 1993; Machonin 1996; Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996]. 
This implementation comes up against government officials and economists, who under-
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estimate the problem of varying tempos and the interconnectedness of changes in the 
legal-administrative, political, economic and cultural domains [e.g. Dahrendorf 1991, 
Srubar 1994, Večerník 1996, Sztompka 1996, Illner 1996]. 
1.2 Is there good reason to abandon the transitological approach? 
The present dominance of the transformatological approach to the changes since 1989 is 
usually proclaimed as scientific progress since it has displaced the naive, speculative and 
ideological transitological approach. This dominance also has powerful support from 
organisationally complex and expensive comparative research organised on the basis of 
the mass collection of data in several countries at once. 
There is an equally clear decline of the transitological perspective in public opin-
ion. At the beginning of the changes everyone was caught up in a ‘transitological’ vision 
of a longed-for move to a new order. As the new initial regime should by now be consoli-
dated, there is a growing ‘transformatological’ scepticism due to the overly simplified 
view of these changes as a form of ‘muddled modernisation’. 
1.3 Where does the path to knowledge not lead? 
Dramatic and fundamental change in society cannot be seen as a systematic leap into a 
new order, nor as a planned modernisation of institutions. The basic difference from the 
point of view of understanding is not so much between the transitological and transforma-
tological approaches as between a closed and an open view of the basic changes in soci-
ety. The former makes the suggestive but mistaken assumptions that: 
– there are strict rules or laws governing fundamental changes; 
– the objectives of these changes are determined by the previous development of society 
and are independent of the choices of involved persons1 (individuals, groups, communi-
ties and organisations); 
– the only influence open to those actors is the choice of the right or wrong route to these 
objectives. 
The open view, on the other hand [see, for example, Stark 1996, Illner 1996, Kabele 
1998a, Havelka 1997], does not look at the effects of the parallelism of endogenous and 
exogenous processes or of transitions and the subsequent normalisation on the macro- 
mezo- and micro-levels of society as fully determinate. They have unclear and unique 
features and are not completely predetermined by past events either in their origins or in 
the course they follow. 
1.4 What comparative advantages does the open transitological approach offer? 
If fundamental changes in society are seen as a unique, piecemeal and stratified disconti-
nuity, the changes can be seen as dependent on circumstances and so on the non-standard 
choices of all persons involved. This allows us to take into consideration the transaction 
cost of the choices of the key actors, that is the cost of: 
– obtaining reliable information, 
– the risk of decisions made on the basis of incomplete information, 
                                                     
1) The mark of a person is the free and sovereign choice to act. Persons are not only individuals, 
but, in opportune social conditions can also be social units (groups, organisations, communities) 
and even whole societies. In the latter case these can be termed collective persons. 
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– co-ordination of approaches and settling conflicts, 
– enforcement of accepted rules and agreements. 
These transaction costs influence inevitably the course of extraordinary events, making 
them frequently seem to be the result of irrational intervention by the corrupted persons 
involved. For this reason the course of changes has been explained by the moral decline 
of the general public, by their clinging to outdated ideas and habits, or by the imperfect 
personalities of the leaders. 
2. Socially Constructed Transition – A Theoretical Basis 
2.1 What order do social events belong to? 
The course of social events is not fully determined. This is not due just to a distorted un-
derstanding or knowledge of the situation, but the dynamic uncertainty is in fact ontologi-
cal. Social events are therefore an ongoing source of greater or lesser crises and turning 
points, rises, transitions and declines. This also means that the social micro- and macro-
worlds which are created by individuals, groups, communities and organisations to pro-
tect themselves from the crude impulses of uncertain social events and to be able inter-
vene effectively outside their own boundaries, represent orders with two non-
transmissible dimensions: 
– the first – which is the traditional subject of the social sciences – is based on the fore-
seeability of regularities or on rules, 
– the second is based in verisimilitude of orientations and the tendency of a plot, both 
corresponding to an understanding of the course of events as a narrative. 
The first dimension rests on the predictability of the dynamics of the micro- and macro-
worlds, while the second deals with the delicate problem of their unpredictability and 
uniqueness. In the first case we can speak of a dynamic regime in which the uniqueness of 
events can be understood either as the application of the probable relations and working 
rules of the game (and there can well be rules of the game for changing the rules) or their 
abandonment. In the second case the order is seen rather as a world of narratives which 
incorporates and communicates stories, biographies, histories and myths into the all-
encompassing constitutive narrative, at one time of the family, at others of the community 
or the whole society, and refers to their common environment, the world.2 
2.2 What, then, makes the course of social events extraordinary? 
The social order is like both a world of narratives and a dynamic regime made reasonably 
certain by its actors through its definition, negotiation and enforcement in their efforts to 
cope with the uncertain course of events. This can be understood in two ways: 
– The order lasts because it arises out of non-order, here described as a greater or lesser 
uncertainty of the course of social events; 
                                                     
2) The theory of dual social construction [Kabele 1997] sees social orders as being constructed 
through institutionalisation (which shape the dynamic regime) and through narrativisation (which 
shapes the world of narratives). This produces an architecture of game frameworks which allow 
both individual and collective persons to understand the course of social events. It makes these 
participants into actors in the course of events and allows them to co-ordinate their interventions. 
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– For internal and external, local and global reasons the order finds itself sometimes in an 
extraordinary situation in which written contracts and unwritten agreements are no 
longer sustainable and the steps already taken towards negotiating and enforcing of the 
order are precluded so that new ways of doing so must be found, that is, developed, ne-
gotiated and enforced. 
The extraordinary course of events represents principally uncertain – but by no means 
chaotic – events which, even despite great difficulties, are made locally more certain 
within the limits of its social construction. Such construction happens more or less con-
sciously and spontaneously through the usage of basically identical semiotic capacities, 
and reserves of acquired experience which are in force within the normal process of mak-
ing the social order sufficiently certain. On the one hand, the extraordinary course of 
events is therefore non-order, which is incorporated step by step into the order in a unique 
way, while on the other it represents a special meta-order of social construction. 
2.3 What are the courses of the basic social changes? 
Fundamental social changes are described, experienced and shaped by the behaviour of 
the actors in such a way that two not entirely distinct phases can be distinguished: 
– an extraordinary period of dramatic change (the real transition), which tends to be rela-
tively short (it is this period that is the primary focus of our interest), 
– a period of normalisation which, on the other hand, tends to be relatively long. 
In a transition there must be a break with a tradition. The old order is partially disman-
tled. A society or lower social unit (groups, organisations, communities) moves into a 
state of transitional anomie, which makes it possible to gradually develop, negotiate and 
enforce the new order. 
In this perspective transitions are constructed by many people as a provisional ar-
rangement. This provisional state shows a rich dynamic of social problems and an unbal-
anced and unstable distribution of losses and gains. The resulting conflicts become – in 
successful cases – part of the universe of myth, in which these conflicts are seen as a se-
ries of crises/tests that thrust the society indirectly from the old order to the new. 
2.4 How can transitions penetrate a society? 
The idea of order can be related both to the society as a whole and to the lower social 
units (groups, organisations, communities) that are part of it, and even to its individual 
members. Every societal order is basically an order of orders and its continuation nor-
mally depends primarily on tradition. The process of transition has the potential to affect 
all the coexisting and interrelated units in this order of orders. The hierarchical arrange-
ment of individuals and social units and the spread of influence from one ‘storey’ of so-
cial events to another is one of the basic forms of both the spread and the normalisation of 
changes and transitions in the order of orders. On higher levels – in the social units which 
include the given unit – the dismantling of the order and the transitional changes going on 
at lower levels are often a normal part of a dynamic regime and of the world of narratives. 
For example, all groups, organisations and communities to some degree build biographi-
cal transitions and the death of individuals into their order. 
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2.5 What events make the course of transition anomic? 
Transitional anomie leads to a major weakening of the enforcement of order [normative 
control, Durkheim 1957] over and above simple crisis situations, because the players 
must react to the fact that the old regime can ‘apparently’ no longer continue to exist in 
the same way. On the one hand it may break up spontaneously – in a spreading chain 
reaction, and on the other hand a disloyal but influential opposition may emerge inside it 
and effectively present an alternative vision of the regime. Transitional anomie has cer-
tain distinguishing marks: 
– the old order ceases to be sufficiently well enforced on different levels and there are 
increasing deviations of all types, 
– practices that had in the past been conducted in secret now move into the open, 
– on a local basis, the regime breaks down and finds itself in confrontation with shadow 
practices that have arisen in reaction to it, 
– in many cases the old order is protected because it could not be quickly replaced by new 
arrangements, 
– in many spheres the regime finds itself in major conflict with newly emerging rules of 
the game, 
– new working rules are sometimes only added to the game when they act as a front for 
the continuation of old practices or the spontaneous ad hoc emergence of new ones, 
– there is an unanticipated misuse of the new rules. 
In transition it is not only the dynamic regime that must pass through fundamental 
changes, but also the world of narratives, which must be narrated anew both in parts and 
as a whole. Only thus can the temporal rift caused by the end of the old regime be bridged 
and can the subjective identity of the persons (people, groups, communities and organisa-
tions) acting in transition be renewed. Transitional anomie therefore also means the 
breaking down of the guarantee of the identities of both individual and collective persons 
by formerly negotiated biographies and histories which unfortunately offered a promising 
life course only under the old order. The reason for this breakdown is an obvious and far-
reaching but unclear change in the estimation of what is and what is not right and impor-
tant. The typical sign of the destruction of the world of narratives is the overproduction of 
ad hoc composed narratives of the past, present and future, which individual or corporate 
persons are unable to identify with. 
2.6 What are the outcomes of the basic social changes? 
It should be recalled that the extraordinary is always temporary. In any circumstances it is 
introduced gradually into the order. At the same time the old order may be renewed in a 
more or less modified likeness, allowing us to talk about its restoration or modification. 
Like modifications of the old order, a new order is not clearly determined by the original 
state of the old order, nor is it generally in accordance with the original transitional vi-
sion. Extraordinary courses of events can also become bogged down in a chronic state of 
crisis: this can of course, from the point of view of this theory, become stabilised, creat-
ing a regime and its own world of narratives. 
The extraordinary stage of transition concludes when the participants in events 
cease to see them as provisional. The task in hand then becomes the normalisation 
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[Kabele 1993b, 1998b or consolidation, Schmitter 19943] of the new order, the enforce-
ment of its regime and the coping with the formerly provisional arrangements that were in 
many ways ‘justified’ by the apparent anomie. The period of normalisation sees both a 
spontaneous and (at least on the part of the new rulers) intentional de-dramatisation of the 
life of the group or society and the deconstruction of the mythical aspect of fundamental 
change. There is a deep-reaching adjustment in the interpretational and interventional 
framework for the resolution of social problems.4 At this point it is no longer enough to 
rely on either extraordinary measures or the extraordinary willingness of victims. It is 
instead necessary to ‘compel’ institutions to take measures in order to fulfil the tasks for 
which they were established and to induce all players to really respect the new institu-
tional framework. 
The climate of normalisation throws the black-and-white mythical view into disre-
pute and instead reinforces the anti-mythical view of the changes that have already taken 
place. In the perspective of the established new order, light is thrown onto many dubious 
customs and events from the transitional period and the groups, organisations, communi-
ties or society tends to be destabilised for a second time by the recognition of the costs 
linked with the transitional anomie and the ‘debts’ that this has left. In the normalisation 
climate – at least in the first years (1995-1998 in the Czech Republic), there tend to be 
incessant crises of social groups, communities, organisations or society, which are gener-
ally perceived as the results of insufficiently enforced or poorly conceived changes. Ac-
cording to the critics, institutions have been established and laws amended but these 
institutions have not changed sufficiently to be able to produce effective solutions, or 
                                                     
3) Schmitter, and indeed the majority of political scientists, see consolidation only in terms of the 
political regime and in concrete terms of the stabilisation of democracy. The concept here is there-
fore broader, in that normalisation is taken to encompass all the basic dimensions of the order (i.e. 
political, economic, legal and ethical, see 3.1) and involves all political regimes. Schmitter’s view 
of the connection between consolidation and the change of a paradigm could be also criticised. It 
is necessary – according to him – to move from the study of actors’ actions and decisions in the 
highly uncertain conditions typical of transitology, to a study of the institutional structures which 
are established by the authorities in negotiations with all actors in the stabilisation. Schmitter 
seems to resign from the basic comparative advantages of a transitological approach, which lie in 
the fact (see 1.4) that it makes it possible to see the change as a series of events, making it condi-
tional on the non-standard choices of the actors. This makes it possible to take into consideration 
the unavoidable transaction cost of the choices of key actors. In its starting point, therefore, 
Schmitter’s consolidology is hardly dissimilar to the prevailing transformatology. 
4) Normalisation is the basic strategy of the party of those who are trying to solve the problems of 
society [Kabele 1998b] in each time. They attempt to ‘deactivate’ the dramatic nature of social 
problems and their moral and political urgency, so that either their institutional solution will be-
come a normal part of a shared social world and satisfy the demands of their complainants, or can 
be effectively solved or rejected as problems. The preferred strategy is to set up a special organisa-
tion to solve each concrete social problem, which can then demonstrate that it has done something 
to resolve the problem. Such organisations can thus silence the original demands by saying that 
they have gone some way to satisfying them, but they also often fall prey to the bureaucratic syn-
drome [Crozier 1964] and they are skilful in dismissing these demands. The popularity of this 
strategy is shown by Benáček’s and Středová’s data [Benáček, Středová and Šlaisová 1998]. They 
show, for example, that employment in the Czech state bureaucracy was 51% higher in 1994 than 
in 1990 (and in the following three years it rose by a further 24%). Its cost as a percentage of the 
GDP also rose (as yet figures are available only for the period of 1993-1997). 
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alternatively, the unintended negative effects come to be seen as more important than the 
benefits. 
2.7 What do all transitions have in common? 
They must resolve the ‘unresolvable’ problem of reconciling discontinuity and continuity, 
for both individuals and the society. In order to cope with the derailment and the return to 
an order, individual and collective persons use basically identical semiotic capacities 
which provide the dramatic phase of transition with a mythical framework based on the 
competition between myths and anti-myths. Myths are the only effective defence against 
transitional anomie, determining the course of events and the sense of investment and of 
victims, mirroring the constitutive disposition of consciousness to renew hope. 
After the dramatic phase of transition comes a relatively long phase of consolida-
tion or normalisation. In the light of the newly established order’s promises, however, the 
dramatic aspects of normalisation (continuing collapses and crisis) are already seen as 
improper. 
2.8 Why do transitions become politicised? 
Transition brings social upheaval. Both actual and expected losses and gains touch many 
people and groups, organisations and communities, which are also forced to transform 
themselves (induced transformations and transitions) and join together into effective coa-
litions. In such a situation the particular constellation of individual and collective persons 
forming any social unit can have a marked effect on the course of its transition. In the 
case of small groups of two, three or four individuals, or big corporations, a very specific 
course of events can be expected. In larger social units and arrangements, however, dif-
ferent strategic groups take shape and can become transitional ‘movements’. It can be 
said that transitions expand and change as a result of political conflicts. At the same time 
they lead spontaneously to the unstable polarisation of society into those who are locally 
or globally for certain changes and those who are against them. 
2.9 Why do transitions in fact need a mythical framework? 
The transition of a social unit is always linked with attempts to get around or to change 
the rules of the game during the process of dismantling old institutions and establishing 
new ones, usually ‘borrowed’ from outside worlds. These often conflicting attempts 
throw the course of social events into relative chaos. The mythical framework, however, 
can provide a common direction for the transition, showing the clashes between its good 
and bad protagonists and can determine the time frame for the extraordinary existence of 
social units in the provisional situation [Kabele 1994, 1998b]. By their very obviousness, 
which rests on common faith, myths endow the transition with legitimacy and help those 
involved to endure the trials linked with the extraordinary times. In this way they greatly 
reduce the transaction costs which are inevitable in the co-ordination of choices, and in 
the negotiation and enforcement of both temporary and permanent measures. Only the 
increasing transitional normalisation can make the mythical framework relatively dispen-
sable, because the role of reducing transaction costs is shifted to the new constitution, or 
statutory realm, and to other rules of the game which have been enforced or spontane-
ously accepted during the changes. 
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2.10 Why do transitions which affect the whole of society have a particular nature? 
Societal transitions differ from transitions of lower social units in that they do not gener-
ally take place through the inclusion into the relatively stabilised relations of higher social 
units, that is, in an environment of well-established communication, morality, justice, 
law, the market and political competition relatively untouched by anomie. Moreover, a 
vision of the new order is fundamental to these ‘endogenous’ societal transitions, as it 
provides the only way out of the crisis of the old order. Here the above-mentioned myth 
is not just an instrument of the transition, but also serves as a substitute for the stable 
environment of some higher social unit. 
The transition of Czech society in 1989-1993 was at one and the same time part of 
the break-up of communist Czechoslovakia, of the collapse of the former communist bloc 
and, as is now being recognised, of the changes of the entire northern hemisphere. The 
environment in which it took place was relatively unstable, both in institutional and narra-
tive terms. 
3. The Transition of the Czech Republic 1989-1993 
“Revolutions are melancholy moments of history. (…) Before they occur, there are many 
years of repression, of arrogant power and malign neglect of people’s needs. A stubborn 
old regime clings to privilege, and by the time it begins to reform its ways it lacks both 
credibility and effectiveness. People do not like it. Energies of conflict build up into a state 
of tense confrontation. It is a powder keg. When a spark is thrown into it (…) an explosion 
takes place and the old edifice begins to crumble. Suddenly everything seems to give. Yes-
terday’s high treason becomes today’s law of the land, and yesterday’s law today’s trea-
son. To the more excitable, vistas of unheard-of opportunities open up, ‘people power’, 
liquefaction of everything hard and fast, utopia. Many are caught by a mood of elation. Not 
just the abuses of the regime, but the constraints of society itself seem suspended. 
However, the honeymoon does not last. (…) Turmoil does not help economic develop-
ment, and political instability raises fears. Suddenly the mood changes. Sometimes, a for-
eign power intervenes and thereby leaves utopia intact, though not the revolution. 
Sometimes, a Jacobin faction within takes over from the impotent majority. Is not ‘people 
power’ a contradiction in terms? Quickly, the slogans of better days are perverted to justify 
a new regime of terror. (…) Many years later, people realise that there have after all been 
lasting changes. The first day of the revolution is celebrated as a public holiday. But in the 
meantime a generation of disillusioned men and women have vacillated between sullen 
submission and vain protest.” [Dahrendorf 1988] 
Modern societal transition can only be really understood through the ethno-theory of 
revolution or, in this case, a more precise myth of transition. This ethno-theory constitutes 
the skeleton of a general interpretation of societal transition, which provides an overview 
of the fundamental changes in society, its basic trends, its time scale, and the clashes be-
tween the main players. Such a framework is used not only by lay persons and politicians, 
but also scholars [Popper 1950]. Both transitological and transformatological approaches 
need such a framework, as only such an interpretation can provide the key to both the 
selection of historical facts and the selection and interpretation of key social processes 
and adequate indicators and variables. 
3.1 Where from, where to and how long? 
If a change is viewed as a transition, its direction and duration are already implicit in this 
view, as both the end of the change and the general course of events are anticipated. 
However, it is not enough to say, either ex ante or ex post, that the transition of the Czech 
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Republic was a move from real socialism to democratic capitalism [see, e.g. Kabele 1992, 
Przeworski 1992] as both concepts only seem clear at first sight, and there is considerable 
doubt as to the exact relation between them at any one point of the transition. It must also 
be said that in a transition they do not even serve as concepts which indicate a certain 
type of order, but rather of suggestive and mutually dependent images: of an ironic cari-
cature and a dreamy mirror-image vision of this. For Furet [1994] revolution leads to a 
symbolic inversion of the imaginary of the old regime. In reconstructing the changes in 
the Czech Republic, both capitalism and real socialism should be seen as orders which 
encompass all aspects of society, that is, political, economic, legal and ethical. Counter-
posing them as mental types – in accordance with contemporary views – produces the 
following basic oppositions: 
 Capitalism Socialism 
Economy Market, with private ownership Planned, with state ownership 
Politics Parliamentary democracy Democratic centralism  
 and constitutionalism  and the leading role of one party  
Law Division of public and private law Class approach to rights 
Ethics Individual social responsibility Social solidarity 
 
From the definition (see 2.3) fundamental change cannot be achieved in the short term but 
also it cannot be allowed to continue for decades. In the medium term (5 years, perhaps?), 
the balance of these changes can provide a reasonable compromise in the initial descrip-
tion of them. Dahrendorf’s [1991] well-known theoretical bon mot of the three speeds of 
the transformation offers a more sophisticated expression of the room for manoeuvre in 
such changes, but I do not find it fully convincing. He suggested that lawyers have six 
months to reform the constitution, politicians six years to reform the economy, and citi-
zens sixty years to recreate a civil society. 
3.2 How was the last Czech transition viewed? 
Dahrendorf’s [1988] a posteriori description of the revolution (transition) is a sceptical 
view from a certain distance of both time and space. This robs it of any mobilising force 
which would allow the ‘revolutionaries’ to believe in the justice and inevitability of their 
actions. It does, nonetheless, grasp the basic narrative structure through which the partici-
pants perceive the changes, which creates two mythical structures that bare their teeth at 
each other. They can be described as the drama of the erosion of the old regime and that 
of the birth of a new order. The point they have in common (either at the beginning or at 
the end) is the special attention to the most attractive revolutionary upheaval. 
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EROSION OF THE REGIME  BIRTH OF A NEW ORDER 
 
Exposure (collision)  From prose to drama ┐ 
 + the birth of the opposition │ 
Crisis Persecution of the opposition ├ Exposure (new beginning) 
 + weak enforcement  │ 
Peripeteia Moves towards reform ┘ 
 
Catastrophe Revolutionary upheaval Collision 
 
 ┌ Provisional state 
 │ Drama of the dynamics Crisis and peripeteia 
Catharsis – reconciliation ┤ of social problems  
 │ Second wave of the revolution Catastrophe 
 └ Normalisation Catharsis-reconciliation 
 
The revolutionary upheaval (which may be more or less abrupt, compare, for example, 
Czechoslovakia with Hungary) therefore concentrates the ‘highest’ symbolic force. For 
all those involved, historical time is divided into the time before and the time after. All 
the old tales are either broken off for good or at least set on a completely different course 
[Kabele 1992]. 
3.3 How did the structures of myth contribute to the inner view of transition? 
The mythical backdrop to the drama of the erosion of the regime is very well described 
by Greimas [1966]: the initial part of the myth begins with a series of negative functions 
(the coming together of the unhappy and alienated, the breaking off of dialogue). The 
turning point is ushered in by a string of trials based on arrangements (usually between 
the main protagonist and the accomplice holding transcendental power). After these trials 
comes a series of positive functions (unhappiness is overcome and the main protagonist is 
rewarded). 
The drama of the birth of the new regime has a similar structure, although in this 
case it is dual: it incorporates both the basic model and its mirror image. The initial stage 
of the myth starts with a series of positive functions (growing happiness, euphoric indi-
vidual experiences and a will to reach agreements), which also have another more nega-
tive face (the loss of certainty, local and sometimes very unpleasant turning of coats and 
the polarisation of new and old structures). The turning point (towards good or evil?) 
follows with a series of trials which break unwritten agreements on the unity of society, 
but are at the same time heroic, with victims calling for confrontation with the transitional 
anomie. In Dahrendorf’s scenario this is succeeded by a negative phase of the second 
revolution (increasing repression and the suffering of the innocent where; in the Czech 
case at least, the political forces took shape around the anti-myth), whose mirror image is 
the new regime’s gradual moves to transformed society, leading through a normalisation 
phase to the practical and symbolic acceptance of the new order. The above duality corre-
sponds to the fundamental equivocation and dual nature of events in the drama of the 
birth of the new order. This drama is played out in the open competition of myth and anti-
myth, which is gradually played out in the political polarisation of society and in transi-
tional conflicts. 
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3.4 Why did real socialism seem to last for ages? 
The real socialist regimes remained stable in most countries of the Eastern Bloc, despite 
the weakness of their inner and outer enforcement. Until it was totally clear that it was 
inescapable and unreformable, most of those involved – both people and organisations – 
had a real interest in preserving the socialist regime. There was a general conviction that 
it was necessary to come to terms with its shortcomings and this was made easier by the 
wide-ranging shadow sphere created by the regime itself, where the actors could enjoy 
their characters based more and more on the idea of individualism. This situation post-
poned the overturning of the regime, but also represented an ‘invisible’ evolutionary 
change which was already moving in the direction of the later transition [Možný 1991, 
Bayer, Kabele 1996]. This meant that before and during the transition society had to 
move from the obviously utopian scenario of liberation to an acceptance of a vision of 
transition and the new order [a concrete utopia, Srubar 1994], which could become the 
focus of shared faith and a reason for taking risks. In the opportune conditions this vision 
could then become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
3.5 Who cracked the old regime? 
In the course of a transition in any direction the preliminary weakening of the old re-
gime’s mechanisms of enforcing order is of fundamental importance. A disloyal opposi-
tion forms in the bosom of the old regime and is visible to the public, and when the 
‘revolutionary upheaval’ comes this opposition can offer trustworthy leaders and can 
found a relatively effective social movement, leading the upheaval and then taking power 
on a provisional basis [Arendt 1965; Bayer, Kabele 1996; Marada 1997]. In the Czech 
Republic this role was played by Charter 77 and the Helsinki Committee for the Protec-
tion of the Unjustly Accused. In the last two years prior to November 1989 these groups 
diversified into a whole range of smaller groupings with differing programmes and more 
limited political aims. The regular demonstrations on particular occasions also helped 
mobilise the half-loyal background of dissident circles [Šiklová 1990]. 
A similar process of ‘mobilisation’ could also be seen however among the highly-
placed and ambitious functionaries of the regime, who saw a possibility of unseating the 
old guard in the leadership of the Communist Party. By 1989 the group of the ‘normalis-
ers’ dating back to 1969 were visibly ‘morally exhausted’ with the effort to satisfy the 
demands of socialist consumerism, and to keep both the nouveaux riche of the shadow 
economy and the ever more daring dissident structures under control. With the changes in 
Poland and Hungary, the Soviet Union had ceased to be a sure guarantee of the Commu-
nist Party’s supremacy and Comecon had begun to fall apart as an international exchange 
mechanism for goods and raw materials. 
3.6 How did Poles and Hungarians help Czechs in the transition? 
The problem of starting the move from the obviously utopian scenario of liberation to the 
acceptance of a programme-vision of transition brings us back into the realm of the mys-
teries of narrative representation and parable [Ricoeur 1986, Kabele 1997]. This semiotic 
capacity satiated by imagination transformed the fictional forecast-scenario of the re-
gime’s fall into a thinkable ‘reality’ founded on faith, which was already starting to take 
shape. In this mythical framework it was easy to find signs of the regime’s passing. Thus 
emerged the captivating dilemma of the crossroads of two irreconcilable trajectories: the 
slow disintegration of the regime or rapid transition. The above-described ‘historical’ 
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work ending with the choice of fundamental change and followed by visible acts was by 
and large accomplished in Poland and Hungary. 
3.7 How does one do revolutionary upheaval like the Czechs? Velvetly, of course! 
In the Czech Republic the actual changeover of power came rapidly and fitted into the 
framework provided by the traditional (1918, 1948, 1989 and even 1968), non-tragic but 
still dramatic ritual of transfer of power: 
open conflict → mass → symbolic → denouement based on the 
with power  demonstrations  general strike  respecting of political will 
 
The apolitical majority became politicised with the drama of preparing for the general 
strike and began to participate actively by presenting declarations and petitions. The revo-
lutionary situation was characterised by the hypertrophy of historical consciousness 
aroused by the judgement of history together with the power vacuum which was the pre-
condition for “the emergence of practical and ideological modes of social action” [Furet 
1994]. The down side of this hypertrophy of historical consciousness was the fundamen-
tal reversal in the concept of the legitimacy of the regime. The ritual of the upheaval was 
played out both inside and outside society by the convincing election of Václav Havel as 
president by the communist members of parliament in January 1990. 
3.8 So was the changeover of the order in fact a drama or an institutional  
reconstruction? 
The birth of a new order – seen from within – is a drama in which it is important whether 
the political forces that summon the revolutionary upheaval can offer a successful alterna-
tive vision and can manage to preserve some room for manoeuvre. Only thus can these 
forces be seen by the public as ‘constructive’ and able to realise at least the broad lines of 
their vision, that is, to take control of the hectic dynamic of social problems thrown up by 
the transitional anomie without having resort to force or even terror. A successful return 
from the extraordinary to order – even though we may have considerable doubts when we 
compare this order with the original vision – is therefore possible when there is a wide-
ranging dismantling of the old and the construction of a new regime with a rapid institu-
tionalisation, which is allowed by the freeing of relations in a state of transitional anomie. 
The drama of the birth of the regime highlights therefore the key problem of transition, 
the transaction costs linked with the negotiation and enforcement aspects of the disman-
tling and constructing regimes, which the transformatological view as a rule disregards 
[with the exception of Stark 1996]. 
3.9. How did this transition interfere with people’s everyday lives? 
In the Czechoslovak transition, the dramatisation of the changes was largely determined 
by the dynamics of social problems [Kabele 1993b]. Both the public and the strategic 
groups placed undue significance on some events and processes, while others were sup-
pressed. The transition spread through society, destabilising the grounds for actions by all 
those involved, from individuals to whole regions. They now faced new opportunities, 
but also threats to their existence. This mobilised them and forced them to change both 
their environments and themselves. Actors in the transition could react in many ways and 
avoid the need for change for a long time. They could work either to suppress the transi-
tional anomie or to intensify it. The resulting transitional expansion must be understood 
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primarily as a process of interaction transferring changes in both directions between the 
level of the social macro-world and that of the micro-world in which individuals and 
families live out their everyday lives. 
3.10 What were the obstacles to dismantling the old regime? 
Real socialism deprived individuals and all social units of their sovereign persons (enti-
tlements to sovereign choices) or displaced these entitlements into a shadow world, leav-
ing the solution of issues to the quasi-person ‘THEY’. THEY allow, force, decide, set the 
obstacles, and so forth. This THEY consisted of the hierarchical infrastructure of the state 
police, army, administration and economy, always coupled with the all-invasive Commu-
nist Party apparatus in which effective power was based on bureaucratic clientelism, pa-
tronage and an effectively monopolised corruption by the Communist Party. To dismantle 
the quasi-sovereignty of ‘THEY’, a renewed plurality of sovereign persons, both indi-
viduals and institutions, was needed, so this dissolution of THEY was also the uncon-
trolled and risky construction of persons. More precisely, this dissolution of THEY 
triggered an actual, anomic flow of events with a multi-faceted narrative significance, 
which could only produce a new order. Earlier attempts at reform only served to arouse a 
strong and spontaneous opposition to these chaotic relations.5 
While it may have seemed during the revolutionary upheaval that the old regime 
had come to an end and that everything had become spontaneously unstuck in the rising 
enthusiasm or transitional anomie, the basic problem of the transition was in fact to ex-
tend it to the lower organisational levels. If transition does not reach the local levels, 
where the distribution of strategic interests can affect every person in the country, either 
positively or negatively, the revolutionary upheaval is necessarily limited to a simple 
transfer of power and in the worst case degenerate into the emerging reign of the Mafia. 
The protagonists of any transition must come to terms with local opposition to fundamen-
tal changes, and must demonstrate and prove the validity of their power of definition. The 
first precondition for such success is to convince this majority that the old regime has 
come to a definitive end and that it is necessary to ‘leap’ into the flow of history and learn 
to swim.6 
3.11 Why was the nature of transition so heavily determined by economic change? 
The dominant and manifest idea of the state socialist transition in 1948-1953 was the 
elimination of private property and with it the market. According to prevailing opinion, 
1989 was in fact fundamentally a move in the opposite direction, that is, a capitalist tran-
sition, and the natural ground for this to be played out was radical economic transforma-
tion, in contrast to Spain or Portugal in the 1970s. It was not difficult for the communist 
powers to destroy the market but at the beginning of the 1990s there was nobody who 
really knew how to revive the personal convictions, responsibility and habits, to create 
the network of institutions and the written and unwritten rules of the game, which had 
taken shape over hundreds of years in the historical market economies. After about four 
years of transformation, these economic conundrums could be summed up in a single 
                                                     
5) In addition to 1968, there were at least three different attempts at partial economic reform which 
would introduce some market elements in communist Czechoslovakia. 
6) The most effective method of convincing people is, of course, terror. In the Czechoslovak case, 
the repellent decay of the Soviet Union played a major role in its rejection. 
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sentence: that it was necessary to introduce budget restrictions, liberalise prices, devalue 
the currency and especially to privatise state property. The steps needed were exactly the 
reverse of those of building state socialism, which started with nationalisation and price 
freezes, made the artificially revalued currency unconvertible and introduced a compre-
hensive system of budgetary measures to redistribute resources. 
After nine years however, by which time the new regime could be expected to be 
visibly normalised, it became paradoxically obvious that: 
– some expected basic changes had not in fact taken place, including those in the position 
of the government and the central institutions (banks) in the economy, 
– it was much more difficult than expected for both individual and new collective persons 
(organisations) to become established in the new democratic and market institutions, 
and in some cases the way they did so must be seen as a deviation. 
Changes in both the new position of the government and in the introduction of suitable 
institutions only went half way. The construction and especially the normalisation of the 
new order had run into long and drawn-out problems with the law, opening up a massive 
shadow area for corruption and less-than-honest practices. The government and the cen-
tral institutions had passed over a considerable degree of economic power to free eco-
nomic subjects, including individual citizens, but they had not been equally successful in 
handing over an adequate degree of responsibility for failure. 
3.12 How did myths help the described transition? 
Solving the problem of dismantling the old regime and constructing a new one in its place 
meant a complex manoeuvre of shedding and rebuilding the legal and institutional ‘shell’. 
This was the riskiest but also the most important task of the transitional period. It called 
for a major collective investment, both intellectual and economic, which had to be under-
pinned by an optimistic vision, and required a very complex and strategic introduction, 
negotiation and then enforcement, if the high transaction costs were not to make it impos-
sible. It supposed a complete reversal of the political, legal and economic reasoning and 
negotiation strategies of the major part of society [Kabele 1993a]. This was only possible 
if it was linked with sacrifice, but also offered transcendental hopes. 
In the period of transitional anomie, market strategies became the driving force of 
the transformation even in the sphere of spontaneous action, thanks to their establishment 
in the universe of myth, which offered a convincing juxtaposition of communism and 
capitalism, of planned and market economies, which could be bridged by travelling a 
dramatic path full of trials (see also 2.8 or 3.2-3.3). In the Czech capitalist transition the 
market should not be seen as a purely economic concept, but rather had a fundamental 
symbolic significance. The market became a mythical figure [an actant, the accomplice 
holding transcendental power, Greimas 1966] which supported the heroic protagonists of 
transition in their struggle with the old structures and the communist Mafia. 
3.13 Why did myths have to resist anti-myths? 
Myths inevitably bring forth anti-myths which invert their content and their primary of 
role of endowing the transition with a sense that can be trusted. The anti-mythical under-
standing of the upheaval and the events that followed rejected the idea that the new order 
was attainable. The shocking extraordinary is an irreversible exclusion from order, or 
events sinking down to total frustration. The irreversibility of the collapse is an essential 
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element of the anti-myth, and is itself a realisation of the negative transcendence of frus-
tration or the all-embracing evil. The anti-myth is first and foremost of becoming irre-
versibly bogged down in the extraordinary disorder or of an unsustainable collapse into 
still worse disorder. 
Myths bring concrete competing visions into play [Srubar 1994] and anti-myths 
destroy these by challenging the sense of trials and risks in the name of such visions. 
Once the transition has been brought successfully under control it is of course important 
that myths – it need by no means be only one single myth – prevail over anti-myths, if the 
extraordinary course of events is not to become bogged down in chronic crisis. 
Transitional normalisation, on the other hand, with the progressive unveiling of 
myths, the exposure of the debts of transition anomie, and the crisis which appears as a 
result of changes that have only been half carried through, naturally reinforces the anti-
mythical view. 
3.14 What were the myths and anti-myths fighting in the Czech case? 
In the Czech case there were two myths that played a key role in the transition to capital-
ism, in defining the directions and nature of conflicts: that of the return to Europe, and of 
belt-tightening during the radical transformation (in the specialised terminology of the 
social costs of economic transformation). In the first case, the democratic capitalism of 
Western countries was in direct opposition to the toppling of the real socialism of the 
countries of Eastern Europe. In the second, the economic myth was an irreconcilable but 
surpassable juxtaposition of the planned and the market economies. Natural extensions of 
this were the myth of the dangers of a third way which would combine the advantages of 
both old and new regimes, and that of the self-made man, which juxtaposed the worn-out 
state bureaucrat and the free entrepreneur. 
The opposition introduced an anti-myth of the betrayal of the revolution, based on 
the polarisation of the emerging hopes and ideals for the revolution and the new elite’s 
apparent failure and arbitrary use of power. In the Slovak Republic this was relatively 
successful, as the results of the 1992 elections were significantly influenced by the politi-
cal myth of a maturing nation, which placed the sovereign nation state in opposition to 
the still developing and non-sovereign nations in thrall to more powerful nations. 
3.15 Why was there a trade-off between adaptability and legal correctness during  
transition? 
Mertlík [1993] described the new institutions as ‘empty shells’, and indeed the institu-
tions (various types of banks, tax authorities and control institutions, etc.) were built up 
from nothing along western lines. They appeared to be copies of Western European insti-
tutions, but were fundamentally different in the way they worked and often exceeded 
their authority. In this way the transitional anomie was thrust out into the corridors of the 
“corridors of power” and took on a less obvious form as a latent “systematic vacuum” 
[Mertlík 1993] which was complemented by shadow institutionalisation. This is also the 
reason why Stark [1996] can speak about the path dependence of the fundamental change 
which is grounded on “rebuilding organisations and institutions not on the ruins but with 
the ruins of communism as they redeploy available resources in response to their imme-
diate practical dilemmas.” 
In the state of transitional anomie the government and other central institutions rule 
primarily through the credibility of external institutional pressure, the mythical frame-
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work of transition, more or less effective bureaucracy, and the extent of available re-
sources, which are primarily the income figuring on their budget. In relation to the state, 
quasi-state and private organisations, the government found itself in the position of a 
principal trying to exert pressure on an agent [see, for example, Coleman 1990]. This 
meant that all these ‘controlled’ organisations could easily make use of their better 
sources of information and better bargaining position – the state is not able to enforce just 
and productive working rules during transitional anomie – to appropriate state resources 
and assets. They could also exert effective pressure on central institutions to ensure a 
degree of security for their risky business undertakings and ‘tolerance’ for their less-than-
transparent business activities and organisational practices [Stark 1996] in return for their 
loyalty. In this way a transitional trade-off between adaptability and legal correctness was 
negotiated, defining the figure of the brand new institutional system. Nevertheless, one 
condition of successful normalisation was the break with the institutional outcomes of 
this trade. 
3.16 When, according to our hypothesis, did the extraordinary stage of the Czech  
transition come to an end? 
The Velvet Revolution, as a ritual of transition, took Czech society into an extraordinary 
period marked by transitional anomie and the successes and failures of ‘building’ a new 
order. This extraordinary time, however, created its own momentum rooted in the helter-
skelter dynamic of social problems, the overall weakness and growing entanglement of 
the government. The split of Czechoslovakia through a set of concurrent circumstances, 
at the same time as the last great step in the economic transformation, tax reform, was 
able to become something of a second ritual of transition, which the public generally al-
ready felt the lack of, but one which brought the extraordinary time to a close. It signalled 
the beginning of the phase of normalisation, the undramatising of social events. 
The end of the dramatic transition did not mean that all the changes originally con-
ceived and still important today had been achieved (ranging from the transformation of 
the railways to a final solution for a state farm somewhere in the Šumava region). Nor can 
it be seen as the transition from an economic transformation controlled by the govern-
ment to an economy with its own momentum ruled by the invisible hand of the market. 
The undramatising of reality immediately revealed that many important changes had been 
‘strategically’ deferred because of high transaction costs. In other cases the reported radi-
cal reform of ministries and institutions turned out to be more of a form of mimicry that 
allowed old practices to survive. So the end of the extraordinary time must be understood 
primarily as a collective symbolic act which confirms the ‘success’ of the transformation 
and at the same time announcing a fundamental change in the rules of the game: the time 
in which problems could be solved by extraordinary means, since ordinary forms either 
did not exist or were clearly ineffective, was at an end. 
4. Final Questions 
4.1 Once more, what advantages does the transitological approach offer? 
The view of the changes in Czech society since 1989 as an discontinuous transition offers 
a hypothetical explanation for the paradox of the ‘founding’ elections in post-communist 
countries (Poland 1989, Hungary 1989 and Czechoslovakia 1990, 1992). In these elec-
tions those voters who traditionally had a stake in a strong system of state social security 
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and who had ‘social democratic ideas’ often voted for right-wing parties instead of for 
those on the left. Szelényi, Szelényi, and Poster [1996] see the explanation for this para-
dox in the temporary victory of the conservative forces in the “game of political sym-
bols”, which strongly articulated the ideological aspects of events. Later (as with the 
Hungarian elections in 1994 and with the Czech case in 1996) came the inevitable shift 
back to political interests.7 Right-wing parties were able to play successfully with politi-
cal symbols because the prevailing mythical framework casting disgrace on the old struc-
tures and ascribing miraculous powers to two mythical actors: the market and democracy. 
4.2 Why is the sunny transition of five years ago now seen as a muddled modernisation? 
There are two virtually inevitable aspects to the change in the lay view. These correspond 
to the strengthening anti-mythical view due to an increased ‘sensitivity’ to the disorder of 
normalisation and the paradoxical effects of the increasing enforcement of the new order, 
which has ‘brought the transitional marasmus into the light of day’ and is encouraging 
people to profit from the disorder ‘as long as the opportunities last’. The normalisation is 
also marked by the fact that both lay and expert publics seek some simplified and closed 
understanding of the fundamental change as a well thought-out and engineered moderni-
sation (see 1.3). 
4.3 Why and when did the Czech government fail? 
The generally held ethno-theory of muddled modernisation and the long political crisis 
places the guilt firmly on the government’s shoulders, accusing it of having made bad 
decisions and directly or indirectly consorting with groups which were misusing the fun-
damental changes in society for their own ends. Both accusations may be true in some 
cases. The sweeping generalisation of the events, however, hides the fact of how little 
space the government had for manoeuvre in the transitional anomie and its overall inabil-
ity to influence the course of transition in the micro-worlds, particularly when it could not 
resort to repressive measures. 
4.4 Why did the crisis in Czech normalisation come with such a delay? 
In retrospect the government came up to scratch in the actual transition but fell down in 
the normalisation. This questionable balance of accounts is marked by a general underes-
timation of the legal extent of the changes needed and the choice of ‘weak and conven-
ient’ ministers of justice (Kalvoda, Novák). It is of course difficult for normalisation to 
become established in opposition to strategies of interest groups, if it is not underpinned 
by a consciousness of crisis and the installation of a new government ‘with a tabula 
rasa’. These interest groups doggedly defend the advantages they have already gained 
during the transition (subsidies, convenient forms of ownership, salaries and pensions 
rising faster than productivity, etc.). 
The ‘great’ and ‘velvet’ Czech success in transition was therefore rather paradoxi-
cally condemned by society, when the government received only a weak mandate at the 
                                                     
7) The shift from political symbols based on the mythical framework to ‘politics of interests’ can 
probably be seen even better in the Czech transition. The second elections were held early – in 
1992, after only two years – when the overall positive mythical framework of the great changes 
was not yet exhausted. They resulted in the victory of the right-wing parties connected with the 
Velvet Revolution. 
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last elections, to wait for stagnation as the impulse to start a more energetic normalisa-
tion. 
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